There are various opinions—and some heated disputes—about the extent to which the OBBB will juice domestic production and employment. Champions of the bill would have us believe that we’re about to witness a bonafide, trickle-down miracle that will push real GDP growth as high as 4.9% in the near term. That’s what the White House Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) is touting.
Critics are mocking the CEA’s rosy outlook, accusing White House economists of basing their projections on “fantasy” assumptions that look nothing like what’s being predicted by more credible forecasters.

One of the reasons the Trump administration is touting these eye-popping growth projections is that republicans are being pressed on the budgetary effects—i.e. debt and deficit—of their “massive” bill. By assuming explosive growth, they hope to sell financial markets (and voters) on the notion that what they’re doing isn’t fiscally irresponsible.
As I’ve been saying in various interviews, I’m not unnerved by what the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Yale Budget Lab (YBL), the Penn Wharton Budget Model (PWBM), or the Center for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB) have to say about the budgetary effects of the OBBB. I look at things through an MMT lens, so the “fiscal cost” of the tax and spending bill doesn’t give me a lot of insight into the things I really care about. What I’m most concerned about are the bill’s human, distributional, environmental, and inflationary impacts.
A point I have been making for decades is that when it comes to inflation risk, it’s not enough to know whether Congress is “paying for” its spending vs. adding to the deficit. The reason is that it would be pretty easy to assemble a tax and spending bill that is deficit neutral but highly inflationary and therefore fiscally irresponsible—e.g. a generous Universal Basic Income (UBI) “paid for” by raising taxes only on those in the top 1% of the income distribution. That would punch up spending by almost every American while doing relatively little to curb demand at the very top. Conversely, I could draft legislation that substantially increases the fiscal deficit while dragging inflation lower—e.g. single-payer health care such as Medicare for All. Total (public + private sector) spending on healthcare as a share of GDP might fall from around 18% to something like 15% (depending on which version of Medicare for All we’re considering), freeing up substantial real resources (including labor). Hence, it would be a mistake to assume that any generic increase in the deficit will necessarily lead to higher inflation or that Congress can avoid inflation by keeping everything deficit neutral.
From an MMT perspective, understanding the sector financial balances means understanding that on the other side of every government deficit lies a matching (financial) surplus that accumulates in some other part of the economy. Who receives those payments, and whether and how that money goes on to enter the veins of commerce—chasing after existing goods and services or spurring new investment—can spell the difference between a benign increase in the deficit (like we had following the 2009 American Rescue and Recovery Act or the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act) and one that makes a mess of inflation.
It’s worth noting that none of the headline macro forecasts referenced above (CBO, PWBM, YBL, CFRFB) predict that the OBBB will lead to ruinous inflation. In part, that’s because they view the package as only modestly expansionary in the short-run. Most of what happens on the tax side is just an extension of the 2017 tax cuts, so there’s no new fiscal impulse to worry about on that front, and a lot of the new stuff (no tax on tips/overtime/auto loan interest/etc.) expires after a few years. When you couple the new tax stuff with higher near-term spending on defense and immigration, all of the headline models project modest inflationary pressures, which the Fed counters by raising interest rates. As interest rates move higher, all of the models assume there will be enough crowding out of private sector spending to push inflation down to the Fed’s 2 percent target in a reasonably short period of time.
So the problem with the OBBB, according to all of these models, isn’t that it provides so much fiscal stimulus that it requires the Fed to aggressively tighten monetary policy. It takes only a modest rise in interest rates to hold inflation in check. The problem, according to CBO (and the others), is that you end up with a worse performing economy relative to a baseline case where the 2017 tax cuts were allowed to expire, shrinking the fiscal deficit over time. In all of these stories, the deficit is the culprit, and a slower-growing—not inflationary—economy is the punishment.
The White House disputes all of this. President Trump wants—and expects—interest rates to be lower, not higher, in the coming months and years. His administration sees more rapid, not slower, economic growth as a result of the OBBB. And the Trump team believes that inflation will trend down, not up, as manufacturing capacity expands and advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) deliver a productivity miracle.
Faster growth. Lower inflation. Lower interest rates.
That’s what Kevin Hassett (director of the White House National Economic Council), Stephen Miran (chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers), and Scott Bessent (U.S. Treasury Secretary) are all promising. In July 7 interview on CNBC, Secretary Bessent said, “We’re going to have economic growth in a non-inflationary manner.” In a joint op-ed a week earlier, Hasset and Miran wrote:
“Another argument raised is that the bill will cause inflation to pick up as growth takes off. Those with this view, of course, fail to account for the fact that a factory spending boom that increases U.S. production drives down inflation by increasing supply. The Biden administration threw fire on inflation with government spending and used skyrocketing regulations to impede supply. To see the effect of today’s proposed policies, look no further than the 2017-19 acceleration in growth that was accompanied by low, stable inflation.”
It would be nice if we could jump directly from the tax incentives that are designed to spur new investment to the shiny new factories themselves, but that’s not how things work. Before a build-up in new manufacturing capacity can help drive down prices, all of those new factories have to be built. And that requires labor (with the requisite skills), capital equipment, lumber, steel, concrete, copper, etc. How is all of this supposed to happen in a non-inflationary way with high (and rising) tariffs on key inputs, a shrinking labor force via mass deportation, and a budget bill that will significantly drive up health care, energy, and other costs?
Long before “Liberation Day,” Secretary Bessent defended the use of tariffs, arguingthat “tariffs can’t be inflationary because if the price of one thing goes up—unless you give people more money—then they have less money to spend on the other thing, so there is no inflation.”
Well, republicans just passed a bill that gives pretty much everyone more money (while setting the stage for higher energy, health care, and other costs that feed directly into inflation). So am I worried? You bet.